Response to Lego Aztec's PETA needs some Chicken!

I thought the video was very interesting insofar as using stem cells to grow meat in a laboratory. However, I do not think that it is the least bit right or justified to do so if we have better alternatives like becoming vegetarian or vegan. Even vegetarianism has its limits insofar as choosing to eat dairy and egg products regardless of animal treatment is inconsistent with the idea of not harming animals for survival when vegetables and other food alternatives are available. I also wonder if it can find justification in countries where vegetables are hard to acquire.

To what extent can we justify in vitro meat production?

Beliefs Lead to Desires?

After our last class, I was a little confused as to why beliefs lead to desires. I always though that you can believe in something like morality without desire. For example, i could do something good for someone without looking for anything in return. In other words, by committing myself to selfless action, I would not have any desire. However, I did not realize that my belief in selflessness created a desire to act selflessly. In performing action there is still motive or desire. Likewise non-human animals performing actions do so with desire no matter how minute the impulse that drives seems.

Response to Finnivan's: Q&A 7, Answer

I think your judgment is very precise.

I was thinking that what if the measurement for human interference should be based primarily on the type of animal we are dealing with. If the animals is a social one, we can interact with them insofar as we do not harm their liberty nor endanger ourselves. So it may not necessarily mean these animals end up in zoos or aquariums. On the other hand, if the animal is solitary then we may want to exercise more caution towards our intrusion into its personal space. We also have to ask whether an animals liberty is more important than saving its life at the cost of its liberty.

Jamieson V. Mathews

In our last class, we leveled many criticisms against both Jamieson's and Mathews attitudes towards pet keeping. Among those, I thought the criticisms pertaining to their hasty generalizations were the most precise. However, I do not think we should completely disregard their ideas completely; rather, we should balance them. Jamieson contends that all pet keeping should be abolished, but this precise stand does not benefit the human dog relationship. Against Jamieson, I would argue that animals that do benefit from human interaction should be cared for by human hands. Contrary to this, Mathews contends that the possibility of creating a greener city is limitless with animal integration in human life; however, she does not consider the animals need. Against Mathews, I would argue that animals who do not benefit from human interactions, regardless if they can defend themselves against humans, should not be interfered with because their interests are compromised.

Response to Finnivan's: Labeling Products

I think Avery makes a very strong point here. If our language is corrupted insofar as identifying animals, who is to say that it stops there alone? Can our manipulation of language be detrimental to arrivng to precise moral conclusions also? For example, we may say that it is justifiable to kill another animal when there is nothing else to eat on a stranded island because we have a right to live. However, this is truly dependent upon intent. Knowing that we are capable of higher moral abstractions, we can say an animal is no better than a mentally ill human being. If we were on an island with a mentally ill human being instead of an animal, should we kill him or her for survival?

Jamieson's Liberty in Kant

I find Jamieson to be very reasonable in his argument for liberty. Animal liberty itself seems to be a foreign idea to my mind. This is probably due to the fact that I think myself human and forget that humans are also animals. If I have the liberty to pursue my ends to the best of my capabilities like my fellow humans, then why shouldn't other non-human animals not have the rights. Certainly, we can for the most part agree that it is wrong to use others as a means to an end because in doing so we leave our selves to the same circumstances. This would not be liberty because I am always at odds with others for control. At moments I will control and in other I am being controlled. So it is better to treat others as ends in themselves to avoid such cylces of ups and downs. Likewise, we should habituate our selves in this practice towards animals, not because they can reciprocate this treatment; rather, it is so we can be able to attain ethical consistency for its own sake.

Response to Andrew McNamara's Post: Does the labeling of an animal, for example ''laboratory animals'', have an effect on its moral status?

I agree it certainly does. The whole purpose of a lab is to utilize instruments for the purpose of advancing one's cause (could be his self interest, human interest, or other interest). When we keep animals in labs, we are not acknowledging their intrinsic value. They are instruments (possessing extrinsic value) for what we deem fit for them. We try to be nature's regulatory force when we try to prevent something in nature to occur that might harm us. Our best defense besides self interest is that we are preserving nature, but is that true? Isn't it reductive to self interest still since nature continues regardless of human existence?