Response to Lego Aztec's PETA needs some Chicken!

I thought the video was very interesting insofar as using stem cells to grow meat in a laboratory. However, I do not think that it is the least bit right or justified to do so if we have better alternatives like becoming vegetarian or vegan. Even vegetarianism has its limits insofar as choosing to eat dairy and egg products regardless of animal treatment is inconsistent with the idea of not harming animals for survival when vegetables and other food alternatives are available. I also wonder if it can find justification in countries where vegetables are hard to acquire.

To what extent can we justify in vitro meat production?

Beliefs Lead to Desires?

After our last class, I was a little confused as to why beliefs lead to desires. I always though that you can believe in something like morality without desire. For example, i could do something good for someone without looking for anything in return. In other words, by committing myself to selfless action, I would not have any desire. However, I did not realize that my belief in selflessness created a desire to act selflessly. In performing action there is still motive or desire. Likewise non-human animals performing actions do so with desire no matter how minute the impulse that drives seems.

Response to Finnivan's: Q&A 7, Answer

I think your judgment is very precise.

I was thinking that what if the measurement for human interference should be based primarily on the type of animal we are dealing with. If the animals is a social one, we can interact with them insofar as we do not harm their liberty nor endanger ourselves. So it may not necessarily mean these animals end up in zoos or aquariums. On the other hand, if the animal is solitary then we may want to exercise more caution towards our intrusion into its personal space. We also have to ask whether an animals liberty is more important than saving its life at the cost of its liberty.

Jamieson V. Mathews

In our last class, we leveled many criticisms against both Jamieson's and Mathews attitudes towards pet keeping. Among those, I thought the criticisms pertaining to their hasty generalizations were the most precise. However, I do not think we should completely disregard their ideas completely; rather, we should balance them. Jamieson contends that all pet keeping should be abolished, but this precise stand does not benefit the human dog relationship. Against Jamieson, I would argue that animals that do benefit from human interaction should be cared for by human hands. Contrary to this, Mathews contends that the possibility of creating a greener city is limitless with animal integration in human life; however, she does not consider the animals need. Against Mathews, I would argue that animals who do not benefit from human interactions, regardless if they can defend themselves against humans, should not be interfered with because their interests are compromised.

Response to Finnivan's: Labeling Products

I think Avery makes a very strong point here. If our language is corrupted insofar as identifying animals, who is to say that it stops there alone? Can our manipulation of language be detrimental to arrivng to precise moral conclusions also? For example, we may say that it is justifiable to kill another animal when there is nothing else to eat on a stranded island because we have a right to live. However, this is truly dependent upon intent. Knowing that we are capable of higher moral abstractions, we can say an animal is no better than a mentally ill human being. If we were on an island with a mentally ill human being instead of an animal, should we kill him or her for survival?

Jamieson's Liberty in Kant

I find Jamieson to be very reasonable in his argument for liberty. Animal liberty itself seems to be a foreign idea to my mind. This is probably due to the fact that I think myself human and forget that humans are also animals. If I have the liberty to pursue my ends to the best of my capabilities like my fellow humans, then why shouldn't other non-human animals not have the rights. Certainly, we can for the most part agree that it is wrong to use others as a means to an end because in doing so we leave our selves to the same circumstances. This would not be liberty because I am always at odds with others for control. At moments I will control and in other I am being controlled. So it is better to treat others as ends in themselves to avoid such cylces of ups and downs. Likewise, we should habituate our selves in this practice towards animals, not because they can reciprocate this treatment; rather, it is so we can be able to attain ethical consistency for its own sake.

Response to Andrew McNamara's Post: Does the labeling of an animal, for example ''laboratory animals'', have an effect on its moral status?

I agree it certainly does. The whole purpose of a lab is to utilize instruments for the purpose of advancing one's cause (could be his self interest, human interest, or other interest). When we keep animals in labs, we are not acknowledging their intrinsic value. They are instruments (possessing extrinsic value) for what we deem fit for them. We try to be nature's regulatory force when we try to prevent something in nature to occur that might harm us. Our best defense besides self interest is that we are preserving nature, but is that true? Isn't it reductive to self interest still since nature continues regardless of human existence? 

Abstract Morality V. Practical Morality

I was a little confused about how it can be morally defensible to kill for ones own sake. After speaking Dr.Silliman, I learned that morality can be abstract or practical. With this in mind, I think I can better answer on what grounds hunting in Zimbabwe is morally defensible.

Abstract morality is based on principles that are absolute. It is never adjusted under any circumstance. Under this type of morality, the people of Zimbabwe are not justified in hunting for their survival if each living entities life is considered of equal value.

Practical morality is more circumstantially based. It adjusts with situations. Under this notion, if all things posses a right to live, the people of Zimbabwe are justified in hunting for sustenance.

Please share your thoughts.

Response To Kurt's: Vegetarianism and Culture

I see your point that politics, economics, and the other provisions mentioned do in fact hinder one's ability to be vegetarian. With regards to culture, I think you touched base on the hidden vegetarians that will come out of their closet when norms have shifted. This change of theirs is very much contingent upon the active increase of the populous who are openly changing before norms have shifted. These are the individuals who are making a change because their sense of duty supersedes their personal sentiment. However, the individuals who are waiting seem to be held back by personal sentiment that is subservient to societal norms and this makes them robots not individuals with free expression. They are hindrance to change because they add strength in numbers to non vegetarians. I am not saying they are wrong; rather, I contend that they prevent the norms from shifting because silent support is simply empty since there is not an apparent tangible force (strength in numbers).

My Take on Animal Experimentation

I think animal experimentation is never morally justifiable since we have no way of truly knowing whether the animal gives consent for experimentation. It is neither morally justifiable to experiment on another species to compensate for our weakness no matter how minor the pain inflicted upon it is nor is it for the benefit of its own species. However, this does not mean we can not experiment on it. We can sacrifice morality in lieu of acceptability. If the harm or death through experimentation of one ape is necessary to save its species we can do it as long as we are near certain of the intended results.

Vegetarianism V. Veganism

I think veganism is more ethically consistent then vegetarianism in some circumstances, but not all. For example, if a vegetarian ignorantly consumes eggs and diary products without knowing the practices or who is harmed in the process of producing this good, then he or she is not ethically inconsistent because they have no access to knowledge they do not know. These cases may be extremely rare, but they can occur. Conversely, if a vegetarian consumes these products and knows the methods in producing these goods were harmful in someway then they are not ethically consistent.

Gomez & Infinite Regression

Gomez's definition of what it means to be conscious is inclusive of first, second, and third person awareness. His contention of a beings ability to have mutual awareness, whereby they can recognize other intelligent agents is enough to show the existence of a conscious being. He limits human bias of being self-aware which is a step beyond just being conscious. Going a step beyond conscious can be abstracted to infinite regress if we persist to add higher layers of consciousness. This will not only lead to infinite regress, but it will also create a species bias in that humans will be the ones capable of the higher layers.

Addition to Patrick Kelly's Critique of Andrew Mcnamara's Life of a Non-Human Animal

Patrick brought up a good point when he said, "their brains are not the same size or shape as ours and that is where we think our intellectual superiority comes from." I remember an anthropology major had come to my high school class and she said that anthropology was not always a respected field because it's theory on head sizes supported slavery. This does not mean the science today is not accurate, but  with regards to this time period it is inaccurate because minorities are some of the leading thinkers of today.

Lynch Does Not Parallel Donnovan

Lynch parallels Donnovan when he speaks on page 4 of his article about the intelligent economy of humans and compares it to animals. By addressing the fact that within our own species we tend to misunderstand each other, Lynch hopes to show that we can't even understand other species. If we can't understand our nature we can't understand anything outside of it. This is where Lynch is different from Donnovan.  Quantitative data is limited to the external and that is our medium used to make assumptions about animals that are not necessarily true.

An Argument for Animals

Today in class we were going over whether or not language is a necessary precondition that produces belief which gives rise to desire and in the qualifies and entitles a being to have rights. R.G Frey claims all of these are a necessary preconditions for an entity to have rights. However, his work does not accommodate for the auto pilot argument. For example, a human driving from work to home that does not realize how he or she got home isn't something that just happens successfully. Likewise, a monkey swinging from tree to tree isn't something that the monkey just gets up and does successfully. Both processes had to occur through habituation. Habituation is a conscious effort to do something to a point where it almost becomes effortless to the conscious entity. Using language as a method to teach is not a necessary precondition to judge consciousness because we do no know whether other being besides ourselves have language. However, we do know that conscious effort is necessary to adapt to a condition. For example, someone in class today mentioned that a wolf was raised by a lion and adapted its way of hunting without regard for its individual disposition compared to the entity that raised it. This wolf habituated itself to an environment that wasn't his own. It's diet may have been altered, but it yet survived like a vast majority of humans who can survive in various climate conditions and different foods that they were not always accustomed to.